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H

EALTH CARE REFORM REMAINS PRECARIOUS IN THE

United States, with intense political disagreement about the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
Former Governor Romney vows to “repeal and
replace” President Obama’s signature domestic achievement. 1 Although repeal would face potentially insurmountable political barriers,2 a Republican president could
selectively enforce the ACA, effectively blocking full
implementation. The president has wide discretion in
implementing legislation, so understanding the scope of
executive powers is important—not only for the ACA but
also for a broad range of social welfare legislation.
ACA Waivers
The Republican health care plan states, “On his first day in
office, Mitt Romney will issue an executive order . . . to issue Obamacare waivers to all fifty states,”1 which appears
to envisage authorizing states to waive all, or major parts,
of the ACA. The Constitution, however, requires the president to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” meaning that he lacks the power “to refuse to execute laws passed
by Congress with which he disagrees,” unless Congress grants
that discretion.3 Because the ACA provides no such blanket waiver authority, granting states authority to disregard
the ACA’s key provisions would likely violate the “take care”
clause.
The ACA does envision that certain provisions could be
waived, permitting innovative state approaches to better fulfill the act’s mission. The secretaries of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Treasury, for
example, could waive provisions—including the individual mandate—if a state can show it would increase coverage and reduce cost without raising the federal deficit.4
States, however, must specifically request such waivers, which
would not become available before 2017. President Obama
has sought an ACA amendment to make innovation waivers available by 2014. Similarly, the ACA retains Medicaid
waiver authority, which grants DHHS flexibility to permit
state alterations to Medicaid.4 These limited waiver authorities, in principle, are intended to enhance, not undermine,
the ACA’s goals of increased access and lower cost.
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Federal Health Insurance Exchanges
Executive agencies have considerable discretion to implement ACA provisions that are ambiguous. One area of ambiguity is in the operation of federal health insurance exchanges. The ACA authorizes states to establish their own
exchanges, but the federal government is empowered to create them if states decline. Several governors have opposed
creating exchanges or taken no steps to create them. The
law also offers premium subsidies for people whose household income is below 4 times the federal poverty level if they
buy insurance from the exchanges. The ACA directs the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to grant subsides as a tax credit.
Due to an apparent oversight, the ACA only explicitly offers subsidies in state-operated exchanges, but the IRS has
issued regulations to extend subsidies to federal exchanges.5
The courts defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations
in the face of statutory ambiguity. The courts would likely
uphold the Obama administration’s approach given evidence that Congress intended the subsidies to extend to
federally operated exchanges. A Romney administration,
however, could alter the regulations, refusing to extend
subsidies to federal exchanges. Given the ACA’s plain language, the courts could uphold such a Romney rule, unless
they concluded that the change was motivated by purely
political reasons and therefore arbitrary. Notably, “an
agency interpretation . . . which conflicts with the agency’s
earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference.”6
The Individual Mandate
The individual mandate operates as a tax, with the IRS
charged with collecting the funds. A President Romney could
instruct the IRS not to make collection of this tax a priority—
potentially signaling that individuals will not be penalized
for failing to purchase qualifying insurance. He could, for
example, effectively fail to collect the tax from individuals
with high-deductible insurance—a long-favored Republican option. If this had the effect of nullifying a key ACA proAuthor Affiliations: Department of Health Systems Administration, Georgetown
University School of Nursing and Health Studies (Mr Kraemer) and O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Messrs
Gostin and Kraemer), Washington, DC.
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vision, the courts might view it as unconstitutional, but the
result is unclear. Notably, when Obama instructed federal
law enforcement officials to deprioritize the deportation of
nonviolent undocumented immigrants, he relied on the traditional executive discretion to enforce the law. Romney, if
elected, could claim a similar level of discretion.
Incomplete Funding of the ACA
Beyond presidential discretion to enforce the law, Congress could fail to fully fund ACA implementation. This approach would not require repealing the ACA so it is more
politically palatable. Congressional scope to starve the ACA
of funds would be limited in relation to several key provisions. For example, Congress directly funded high-risk pools
for individuals with preexisting conditions, health insurance exchanges, the Independent Payment Advisory Board,
as well as the Community Health Center Fund and the Prevention and Public Health Trust Fund. To withdraw this
funding, Congress would have to act through legislation,
which would be difficult in the current political environment.
Congress, however, did not directly fund the expansion
of the health workforce (including loan repayment), quality improvement, reduction of health disparities, and certain prevention programs.7 This discretionary funding is more
susceptible to defunding because it can be accomplished
through congressional inaction. Thus, even if President
Obama is reelected, unless Congress acts affirmatively to fund
important parts of the ACA, health care reform will remain
incomplete.
Repeal and Replace
The approach most often proposed by opponents of the ACA
is “repeal and replace.” Although the details are unclear, this
approach would require congressional legislation to alter or
eliminate substantial parts of the ACA. The most likely targets would be the individual mandate, federal conditions
on Medicaid payments to states, and the Independent Payment Advisory Board. Popular provisions, such as barring
preexisting condition exclusions, might be retained, though
perhaps in a less vigorous form.1 If not done carefully, piecemeal replacement could result in a substantially worse product. For example, by keeping preexisting condition coverage while eliminating the mandate, the cost of insurance
might soar.
“Repealing and replacing” the ACA is unlikely, requiring Obama to lose the presidency and Republicans to hold
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the House and 60 Senate seats to prevent a filibuster. An
alternative approach, through the budget reconciliation process, cannot be filibustered. However, the budget reconciliation process would face fierce Democratic challenges under the “Byrd Rule,” which requires the Senate
parliamentarian to determine whether all aspects of the law
have direct—not merely incidental—effects on federal revenue or spending.2
The ACA has considerable content beyond cost, such as
defined benefits, public health, and higher-quality services. Moreover, the fiscal effect appears positive, with the
Congressional Budget Office scoring the ACA as saving $109
billion. Nor could Republicans use reconciliation to advance a social agenda, such as banning abortion funding,
because of previous rulings that the budget effect is incidental.
Continuing on the Pathway to Fundamental Reform
Repeal of the ACA or blanket state waivers are unlikely given
the political and constitutional landscape. Still, if a President Romney or a Republican-controlled Congress remained determined to do so, there would be ample opportunity to slow or block full ACA implementation. The future
of health care reform hinges on the November 6 election.
The public has a clear choice—either continue on the pathway toward full health reform or scale back and adopt marketbased solutions. What is at stake is a fundamental vision of
how to ensure near-universal access to quality care at an affordable cost.
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